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ABSTRACT 
  
This study analyzes the effect of banking crises towards market discipline in Indonesia. 
This study uses two periods of crisis in Indonesia, which are banking crisis in 1997/1998 and 
banking crisis in 2008. The dependent variable is market discipline; while bank risks are the 
independet variables (insolvency, liquidity, and credit risks). The control variables are 
banking level (the percentage savings of the customer, bank’s size, bank’s overhead costs, and 
Lerner index); industrial level (banking concentration level, the bank development); and 
macroeconomic variables (the growth of the real gross domestic product and inflation rate). 
The variables examined by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). This study finds a 
fact that on average market discipline weakens after Indonesia's banking crisis in 1997/1998. 
On the contrary, this study found a fact that market discipline strengthens after Indonesia's 
banking crisis in 2008. Eventually, this study finds a fact that there is no difference in market 
discipline between the domestic bank and foreign bank after Indonesia's banking crisis in 
2008. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Penelitian ini menguji dampak krisis perbankan terhadap market discipline di 
Indonesia, Penelitian ini menggunakan dua periode krisis perbankan di Indonesia yaitu 
tahun 1997/1998 dan tahun 2008. Variabel dependen adalah market discipline, sedangkan 
risiko perbankan merupakan variabel independen yang meliputi insolvency, likuiditas dan 
risiko kredit. Variabel kontrol terdiri dari level perbankan (tingkat tabungan pelanggan, 
ukuran bank dan beban overhead bank, Lerner index), level industry (level konsentrasi bank 
dan bank development), dan variabel-variabel ekonomi makro yang terdiri dari tingkat 
pertumbuhan produk domestic bruto riil dan tingkat inflasi. Variabel penelitian diuji 
menggunakan Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan 
bahwa secara rata-rata market discipline melemah setelah krisis perbankan di Indonesia 
tahun 1997/1998. Disisi lain penelitian ini menemukan bahwa market discipline menguat 
setelah krisis perbankan tahun 2008.  Penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa tidak ada 
perbedaan market discipline antara bank-bank domestik dan bank-bank asing paska krisis 
perbankan tahun 2008 di Indonesia.  
 
Kata kunci:  Krisis perbankan, market discipline, bank risk taking, Indonesia. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The monetary crisis that has occurred in Asia 
has had a bad influence on the financial system 
and has caused a banking crisis in various coun-
tries. The banking crisis started by the financial 
liberalization marked by the gradual influx of 
foreign currency in the banking sector. The 
liberalization has increased the flow of foreign 
capital to Asian countries that at that moment 
were experiencing positive economic growth. The 
increase of foreign funds was then used as capital 
on high-yield projects. These funds were placed as 
credits with high risks. These decisions show that 
an adverse selection has happened (Hahm and 
Mishkin, 2000). Mishkin (1999) also found that the 
banking crisis that has happened in Asia started 
by the behavior of the banks that do not show 
bankers behaviors by not being careful, not honest 
and taking decisions too fast. When the economy in 
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the Asian region declines and the banking interest 
rate increases, this would pressurize the risk-
takers'(speculators) abilities to return their debts 
so that the banking sector is threatened by the 
reduction of their assets quality. These actions by 
the banks and risk-takers render a big contribution 
to the disastrous situation of the domestic currency 
and banking crisis in Asia, including in Indonesia. 
If analyzed further the market discipline level 
in Asian countries can be suspected as still being 
weak and be one of the primary causes of the 
banking crisis in Asia. The market discipline can 
be defined as a situation where the depositors 
punish the bank by requesting a higher interest 
rate or they will withdraw their money from that 
bank (Cubillas , et al., 2012). Actually, when a 
country has a good market discipline level, the 
banks tend to show banker behaviors and minimize 
speculative acts by the speculators. 
Starting with Thailand in July 1997, this 
crisis has a contagion effect and brought a large 
impact on the conversion rate, stock exchange, and 
other asset prices in several Asian countries 
including Indonesia. Until July 1997, almost all 
people predicted that Indonesia will be very little 
affected by the crisis. As a consideration, at the 
time the economic foundation of Indonesia showed 
a low inflation rate, a trading surplus of more than 
USD 900millions, a large foreign currency reserve, 
more than USD 20 billion, a very good performance 
of the banking sector (Bank Indonesia, 2010). But 
who expected that one month after that the 
economy in Indonesia would also be affected. The 
mistake started when the investment funds in 
Indonesia were used. At that time Indonesia used 
short term loans for financing long-term projects. 
This meant that the debt repayments had to take 
place in a short time, while the profits will be 
obtained after a long time. Moreover, this non-
prudent attitude of the banks in Indonesia in 
disbursing the credits to non-credible parties also 
caused this crisis to occur. Starting with the 
downfall of the Rupiah conversion rate to the US 
Dollar, many banks started to experience losses, 
especially banks that owe money in foreign cur-
rency and did not protect themselves sufficiently. 
Unstable conversion rates with additional worsen-
ing of banks' cash flow caused banks to encounter 
liquidity problems. This caused many banks lost 
the confidence of the public so that the public 
withdrew their money in large amounts. Many 
banks had to close down with the consequence that 
the economy became paralyzed. 
Considering the main cause of the banking 
crisis that occurred in Asia and Indonesia the 
researchers conducted a research on the market 
condition before and after the crisis. This research 
is important to be conducted because Indonesia is a 
"bank based" country whereby the money circula-
tion is 70 % through banks. A thorough under-
standing of the Indonesian market condition can 
minimize the occurrence of a banking crisis that 
could be destructive for the entire Indonesian eco-
nomy.  
Moreover, this research was conducted 
because facts showed that a majority of the pre-
vious studies showed evidence of the weakening of 
the market after the banking crisis. If connected 
with the main factor of the Asian crisis whereby 
the market situation was weak, this fact could not 
be accepted. In fact, this market discipline situa-
tion should have improved after the banking crisis 
in order to avoid another banking crisis to reoccur, 
but facts have been found by earlier research just 
the opposite. 
Haddad et al. (2011) in his research had ana-
lyzed the change in the deposit guarantee scheme 
and capital regulation at Indonesian banks during 
the banking crisis that happened in 1997-1998. 
They found the adoption of the “blanket guarantee” 
scheme which weakened the market condition. 
Other investigations regarding the banking crisis 
impact were conducted by Cubillas et al (2012). 
They analyzed the effects of the banking crisis on 
the market discipline situation by using an inter-
national sample of these banks. This writes up 
shows that on the average the market discipline 
situation weakened after the banking crisis. In the 
meantime, Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) in 
their research using an international database of 
the banks in 51 countries showed that the explicit 
deposit insurance caused the depositors' wish to 
monitor the banks becoming very small and 
weakening the market discipline situation level. 
The cheaper the deposit insurance, the greater the 
weakening of the market. On the other hand, Peria 
and Schmukler (2001) conducted a research invol-
ving three countries samples, i.e. Argentine, Cile 
and Mexico during the period of 1980- 1990. They 
found facts that the depositors punished the banks 
for their risky behavior, by withdrawing their 
deposits and asking for higher interest rates. The 
market disciplinary situation became more impor-
tant after the crisis and the deposit warranty did 
not appear to reduce the market condition.  
This research was conducted to support the 
BCBS regulation (Based Committee on Banking 
Supervision) in July 2004 together with the revised 
edition of June 2006 to produce the Basel II forma-
tion i.e. capital requirement to strengthen the 
performance and maintain the stability of banks 
globally. There are three main pillars in Basel II, 
i.e. capital requirement, official supervision and 
market discipline. The global crisis that happened 
at the time forced the policy makers, banking 
institutions, depositors as well as other parties 
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involved to improve all factors when a bank took 
risks. As an example when Gueyie and Lai (2003) 
stated that discipline factors that affect the bank's 
decision to take risks include disciplining the 
regulation, disciplining by the bank itself and the 
market discipline.  
The market discipline, in general, were agreed 
upon by the regulators and academicians to limit 
the bank risks that always varies and prevent a 
banking crisis (Cubillas, et al, 2012). The research 
conducted by the study was focused on the varia-
tion of the market discipline level in Indonesia at 
the time a banking crisis having a systemic effect 
in 1997-1998 happened and a crisis without 
systemic effects in 2008 (Laeven and Valencia 
2012). This research sees how the relationship was 
between the banking risks and the cost of bank 
deposit changes after the banking crisis. 
By considering that the number of studies 
regarding the impact of the market discipline 
towards the banking crisis were still small and how 
important it was to know the relationship between 
the banking crisis and the expected high market 
discipline level can prevent a crisis and maintain 
the banking stability as well as speed up the 
recovery so that this study would be attracted to 
conduct this research. Through this research, it 
was expected that a systematic proof regarding the 
banking crisis towards the market discipline level 
in Indonesia could be provided.  
 
Theory Framework 
 
Peria and Schmukler (2001) in their research 
researched three countries, namely Argentine, 
Chile and Mexico during 1980 and 1990. They 
found the facts that the depositors would punish 
the banks for their risky attitude, by withdrawing 
their deposits and require a higher interest rate. 
The market discipline level became more impor-
tant after the crisis and the deposit warranty did 
not appear to reduce the market discipline level. 
Then another research by Hadad et al (2011) 
that analyzed the changes in the deposit warranty 
scheme and capital regulation on Indonesian banks 
during the banking crisis that happened in the 
years 1997-1998. They found that the adoption of 
the "blanket guarantee" scheme weakened the 
market discipline level. Other research regarding 
the effect of the banking crisis on the market 
discipline was conducted by Cubillas, et al (2012), 
they analyzed the effect of the banking crisis on the 
market discipline by using an international sample 
of the banks. That study showed that on the 
average the market discipline weakened after the 
banking crisis. 
If looked upon from the research result, it can 
be said that the previous research was not yet 
conclusive whereby several types of research found 
facts that the market discipline level weakened 
after the banking crisis and moreover, concluded 
the facts that the market discipline level streng-
thened after the banking crisis. In addition, from 
the majority of the previous studies, it could be 
observed that the market discipline level is the 
primary cause of the previous banking crisis in 
Asia and Indonesia which had caused the level 
weakening after the banking crisis. If it is 
connected with the Indonesian situation, there had 
been no research conducted regarding the impact 
of the 2008 banking crisis on the market discipline 
level. That is why this study would like to know 
whether the banking crisis weakened or streng-
thened the market discipline level in Indonesia. 
 
The hypothesis formed was as followed: 
H1:  The banking crisis of 1997/1998 has a signi-
ficant effect on the market discipline level in 
Indonesia. 
H2:  The banking crisis of 2008 has a significant 
effect on the market discipline level in Indo-
nesia.  
 
Looking at the previous research conducted by 
Cubillas, et al (2012) and Haddad, et al (2011), this 
study has not yet found a research about the effects 
of the banking crisis on the market discipline level 
for the two crisis periods. This study was interested 
in performing this research, because it connected to 
the Indonesian situation, between the first crisis 
and the second crisis. This study suspected a regu-
lation change and market psychology has happen-
ed that would influence the market discipline level 
during those two periods. As an example, in the 
year 2006, a change has occurred on the blanket 
guarantee to become a limited blanket guarantee 
that this study suspected would cause a difference 
of the market discipline level regarding the two 
crisis periods. Based on that, a hypothesis formed 
was: 
H3: No market discipline level difference in Indo-
nesia had occurred after the 1997/1998 bank-
ing crisis and the banking crisis of 2008.   
 
The research conducted by Haddad et al. 
(2011)which analyzed the change in the deposit 
guarantee scheme and capital regulation for banks 
in Indonesia during the banking crisis that hap-
pened in 1997-1998 found facts that the adoption of 
the blanket guarantee scheme weakened the mar-
ket discipline level. Moreover, they also found facts 
that the market discipline works better with 
foreign banks than domestic banks. Based on the 
study of Haddad et al (2011), this study considered 
that the banking ownership affected the presence 
and market discipline. This study suspected that 
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the market discipline level would be better with 
foreign banks than domestic banks. The reason is 
that foreign banks were supervised by both foreign 
and domestic regulators, and that is why foreign 
banks must have a better management than 
domestic banks. The following were the hypothesis 
that was formed: 
H4:  No difference regarding the market discipline 
level after the banking crisis between foreign 
banks and domestic banks in Indonesia. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Data and Sampling Process 
 
Data used in the research were secondary 
data gathered from several sources. Banks finan-
cial level data were obtained from the Bank 
Indonesia library. Data were used to measure the 
macro variables taken from the World Bank web-
site (www.worldbank.org) and IMF website (www. 
imf.org). 
Data that would be processed in this research 
was the unbalanced panel data because the 
number of bank samples used every year were 
different. In order to test the banking crisis impact 
in the years 1997/1998 towards the market 
discipline level, this research used a sample from 
1994-2007. In addition, for the impact of the bank-
ing crisis of 2008 on the market discipline level, 
this research used the sample of the years 1999-
2011. This study used all of the banks in Indonesia 
as a sample. 
 
Operational Variables Definition 
 
Dependent variable 
 
This study followed Peria and Schmukler 
(2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), 
Haddad et al. (2011) and Cubillas et al. (2012) that 
tested the market discipline by analyzing whether 
the depositor punished the risky bank by request-
ing higher interest rates. The dependent variable 
was the deposits’ cost for the bank at year t 
(COSTDit). This was measured by the annual 
interest ratio towards the total deposit. 
Independent variable 
Regarding this research, this study followed 
Cubillas, et al (2012) and Haddad, et al (2011) 
whereby they used the lagged dependent variable 
COSTDit–1. With this variable, this study would 
like to see whether the deposit cost at present was 
affected by the previous period. In addition, this 
study followed Peria and Schmukler (2001) and 
Haddad, et al. (2011) whereby they considered 
three types of bank risks: insolvency, liquidity, and 
credit risks. 
This study followed Laeven and Levine (2009) 
as well as Haddad et al. (2011) who used the proxy 
Z-score bank (Z-SCORE) as the proxy for the bank 
insolvency. Higher Z-score showed that the bank-
ing condition was more stable because of its inverse 
relationship with the possible bank insolvency. 
Because Z-score was highly skewed, the researcher 
had to use natural logarithm of the Z-score, which 
is normally distributed. Z-SCORE was calculated 
with an asset return level (ROA) and added with 
the capital asset ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of the asset return. This study used the 
current assets ratio to the total assets (LIQUIDITY) 
as a proxy for the liquidity risk as performed by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Hadad et 
al. (2011). This study used the ratio of the set-aside 
credit loss with the total gross credit (LLP) as a 
proxy for credit risks, this ratio is used among 
others by Gropp, et al. (2004) as well as Nier and 
Baumann (2006). 
 
Controlled Variable 
 
This study is following Cubillas et al.(2012) 
included banking level variables, industrial level 
variables and macroeconomic variables as control 
variables. Banking level variables were defined by the 
percentage savings of the customer (CUSTOMERD), 
bank assets size (SIZE), overhead costs 
(OVERHEAD), and Lerner index (LERNER). 
While for the industrial level variable as the control 
variable, this study referred to Beck, et al (2006), 
Fonseca and Gonzales (2010), and Hadad, et al 
(2011) that used the banking concentration 
level (CONC) and the bank development proxy 
(PRIVATECRED). Finally, for the macroeconomic 
variables, this study used the growth of the real 
gross domestic product (GDPGR) and inflation rate 
(INFLATION) as the control variable. 
CUSTOMERD was measured by the total 
ratio of customer’s savings towards the total com-
pulsory interest. The researcher used this variable 
to control the banking deposit percentage that 
generally was guaranteed and not so sensitive 
towards the market discipline.  
SIZE was measured by the natural logarithm 
of the total banking assets. The researcher con-
trolled the influence for several reasons. On one 
side, the savings at certain banks were maybe 
large with lower costs if the hypothesis “too big to 
fail” would happen. The depositor believed that 
they would be compensated by the regulator if a 
problem arose and they had a lower risk as an 
impact of an augmentation of the diversification of 
their asset portfolio (Park and Peristiani, 1998). 
However on the other side, larger banks could pay 
larger fixed deposit interest rates compared to the 
smaller banks if they had a better investment 
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choice or they were willing to be more intensively 
competitive with smaller banks (Rosen. 2007). 
OVERHEAD was defined as the non- interest 
bank’s burden divided by the assets. The difference 
in OVERHEAD can catch the difference in the 
work level or wages as well as a mixture of a 
banking product and service quality. A larger 
expenditure can be associated with a less efficient 
bank performance and thereby decrease the 
deposit’s banking interest, in accordance with the 
traditional efficient–structure hypothesis (Berger 
and Hannan, 1989).  But the expenditure ratio to 
the total assets could also be connected with a 
better service to the customer. If we could control 
the service quality, we could expect that the non- 
interest expenditure increase obtained a positive 
effect on the interest rate (Cubillas, et al, 2012). 
  LERNER, as a banking competitive variable, 
was a proxy to measure the banking market 
strength, defined as the difference between the 
price and the marginal costs expressed asa 
percentage of the price. Like Hadad et al (2011), 
the researcher did not predict a clear sign for 
LERNER because the bank can use a bigger 
market strength to pay a lower interest for their 
deposit, but they can also use to pay a higher 
interest rate to continue strengthening their 
market. 
Referring to Beck, et al. (2006), Fonseca and 
Gonzales (2010), and Hadad, et al. (2011), CONC 
was used as a market structure variable, whereby 
CONC was a proxy for the bank concentration 
level, and defined as a fraction of the three largest 
banks as part of the assets of all public banks in 
our sample. Moreover, PRIVATECRED was used 
as a proxy for a development bank level, and 
calculated with a “private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions over GDP”. 
Finally, this study included the macro-
economic characteristics as the control variable. 
We follow Demigurc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) 
and Hadad, et al (2011) and control for the growth 
of the real PDB (GDPGR) and the inflation rate 
(INFLATION). 
 
Statistic Method 
 
This study applied the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator developed for a 
dynamic data panel model by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) as performed by Hadad, et al (2011), Naceur 
and Omran (2011), Herrero, et al (2009), Albertazzi 
and Gambacorta (2009), Athanasoglou, et al, (2008) 
as well as Dietrich and Wanzenried (2010) to study 
the variation between the banking risks and the 
banking deposit costs after the banking crisis.   
Several reasons this study chose this method 
were: first, this research used the unbalanced 
panel data. Second, there was an autoregressive 
process in the data regarding the deposit cost 
behavior (namely, the need for a dependent lagging 
model to catch the dynamic characteristics of the 
deposit costs). The third was the possibility of an 
endogeneity at the clarifying variable as well as the 
possessions of certain banks that were unknown, 
whereby it could be eliminated by conducting "first 
difference" on all variables. 
The main model used for this research was 
the model that had been used by Cubillas et al. 
(2012): 
COSTDit =  β0 + β1COSTDit-1 + β2 RISKit + 
β3CRISISit + β4RISKitxCRISISit + 
β5BANKit + β6MACROit +
 
+ µi+ є it
 
 
COSTDit constituted the deposit costs for bank 
i for year t. RISKit constituted a collection of three 
risk proxies for bank i for year t (ZSCORE, 
LIQUIDITY, and LLP). CRISISit constitutes a 
dummy variable that took a value of 1 for one year 
after the banking crisis and zero for the period 
before the crisis. RISKit X CRISISit constituted a 
variable that understood the change in the market 
discipline after the banking crisis. RISKit X 
CRISISit constituted a variable that caught the 
market discipline change after the banking crisis. 
Bankit constituted the controlling vector of the 
banking level variable and industrial variable.  
MACROt constituted the vector of the macro-
economic variable. While  constituted 
a dummy variable set to catch all bank-invariant 
time effects that was not included in the µi 
regression and constituted an unobservable bank-
specific effect and єit constituted a white noise error.  
In the above model specification β2measures the 
market discipline level prior to the crisis, and 
β4caught the change inside after the banking crisis 
occurred. Because of the higher values on ZSCORE 
and LIQUIDITY showed a lower level of banking 
risk, the presence of the market discipline at the 
period before the crisis would be shown the 
negative coefficient for these variables (Cubillas et 
al, 2012; Hadad et al, 2011). Weakening or the 
increase of the market discipline after the banking 
crisis would be caught by β4, which meant a 
negative coefficient or positive for the interaction 
between two proxies, namely the banking risk and 
the crisis dummy variable. Because LLP was 
relatively positive towards the banking crisis, the 
coefficient interpretation of this variable would 
become the opposite of what had been explained by 
ZSCORE and LIQUIDITY. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
 Obs Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Jarque-bera Probability 
COSTD 1,965 0.108860 2.404033 0.003553 0.114056 83,6315.5 0.000000 
ZSCORE 1,965 2.468475 6.261288 -3.097473 1.231411 17,61818 0.000149 
LIQUIDITY 1,965 0.965629 0.998761 0.852843 0.025568 1,053.579 0.000000 
LLP 1,965 0.062168 1.683092 0.000000 0.102657 232,961.1 0.000000 
CUSTOMERD 1,965 0.830436 0.993861 0.024555 0.182689 1,720.490 0.000000 
SIZE 1,965 14.18900 20.00809 9.766751 1.920393 73.73743 0.000000 
OVERHEAD 1,965 0.018587 0.192041 0.000756 0.011845 120,229.7 0.000000 
LERNER 1,965 0.458824 0.963216 -2.212755 0.222676 16,358.37 0.000000 
CONC 1,965 0.428727 0.569505 0.356510 0.053899 199.1287 0.000000 
PRIVATECRED 1,965 32.35134 53.52872 17.19195 13.13892 208.5680 0.000000 
GDPGR 1,965 0.044556 0.084000 -0.131000 0.043615 12,157.06 0.000000 
INFLATION 1,965 0.145861 0.753000 0.055000 0.145519 16,884.91 0.000000 
 
The dependent variable is the cost of deposit (COSTD). It was measured by the annual interest ratio towards the total 
deposit. For Independent variables, we include one lag of the dependent variable (LAG COSTD). Furthermore, this 
study includes ZSCORE, LIQUIDITY, and LLP are alternative bank risk measures as independent variables. ZSCORE 
is calculated with an asset return level (ROA) and added with the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of 
the asset return. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.  LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
gross loans. CRISIS constitutes a dummy variable that took a value of 1 for one year after the banking crisis and zero 
for the period before the crisis. CUSTOMERD was the total ratio of customer’s savings towards the total compulsory 
interest. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. OVERHEAD is defined as the non- interest bank’s burden 
divided by the total assets. LERNER is defined as the difference between the price and the marginal costs expressed as 
a percentage of the price. CONC was a proxy for the bank concentration level, and defined as a fraction of the three 
largest banks as part of the assets of all public banks in our sample. PRIVATECRED is calculated with a “private credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions over GDP”. GDPGR is the annual growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. INFLATION is the annual inflation rate from the GDP deflator. The sample period is 1994-2011. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix. 
 ZSCORE 
LIQUIDI 
TY 
LLP 
CUSTO 
MERD 
SIZE 
OVER 
HEAD 
LER 
NER 
CONC 
PRIVATE
CRED 
GDPGR 
INFLATI
ON 
ZSCORE 1.00000 -0.06575 -0.28611 0.18948 0.03839 0.03435 0.26277 -0.38684 0.02929 0.10448 -0.10379 
LIQUIDITY -0.06575 1.00000 -0.00691 -0.31986 0.45782 -0.31428 0.17513 -0.13390 -0.10037 0.07353 -0.07573 
LLP -0.28611 -0.00691 1.00000 -0.10235 -0.03082 0.08304 -0.13404 0.27111 -0.09917 -0.33236 0.24690 
CUSTOMERD 0.18948 -0.31986 -0.10235 1.00000 -0.13343 0.11706 -0.03607 -0.02090 -0.11090 -0.03185 0.00400 
SIZE 0.03839 0.45782 -0.03082 -0.13343 1.00000 -0.23165 0.10623 -0.30299 -0.24791 0.10162 -0.12053 
OVERHEAD 0.03435 -0.31428 008304 0.11706 -0.23165 1.00000 0.15040 -0.04690 -0.03460 -0.02861 0.01634 
LERNER 0.26277 0.17513 -0.13404 -0.03607 0.10623 0.15040 100000 -0.29188 -0.16576 0.18953 -0.16940 
CONC -0.38684 -0.13390 0.27111 -0.02090 -0.30299 -0.04690 -0.29188 1.00000 -0.00092 -0.09259 -0.08319 
PRIVATECRED 0.02929 -0.10037 -0.09917 -0.11090 -024791 -0.03460 -0.16576 -0.00092 1.00000 -0.18018 0.29902 
GDPGR 0.10448 0.07353 -0.33236 -0.03185 0.10162 -0.02861 0.18953 -0.09259 -0.18018 1.00000 -0.91506 
INFLATION -0.10379 -0.07573 0.24690 0.00400 -0.12053 0.01634 -0.16940 -0.08319 0.29902 -0.91506 1.00000 
 
The dependent variable is the cost of deposit (COSTD). It was measured by the annual interest ratio towards the total 
deposit. For Independent variables, we include one lag of the dependent variable (LAG COSTD). Furthermore, this 
study includes ZSCORE, LIQUIDITY, and LLP are alternative bank risk measures as independent variables. ZSCORE 
is calculated with an asset return level (ROA) and added with the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of 
the asset return. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.  LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
gross loans. CRISIS constitutes a dummy variable that took a value of 1 for one year after the banking crisis and zero 
for the period before the crisis. CUSTOMERD was the total ratio of customer’s savings towards the total compulsory 
interest. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. OVERHEAD is defined as the non- interest bank’s burden 
divided by the total assets. LERNER is defined as the difference between the price and the marginal costs expressed as 
a percentage of the price. CONC was a proxy for the bank concentration level, and defined as a fraction of the three 
largest banks as part of the assets of all public banks in our sample. PRIVATECRED is calculated with a “private credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions over GDP”. GDPGR is the annual growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. INFLATION is the annual inflation rate from the GDP deflator. The sample period is 1994-2011. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the result of the above Table 3 it can 
be seen that the banking crisis in Indonesia during 
the period of 1997/1998 had caused a weakening of 
the market discipline level in Indonesia. This could 
be proven by comparing the variables that under-
stood that a market discipline prior to the crisis 
(ZSCORE, LIQUIDITY and LLP). The significant 
influence of the LIQUIDITY variable which had a 
negative sign and LLP which had a positive sign 
showed the existence of a market discipline prior to 
the banking crisis. Furthermore, the significant 
influence of the variable LIQUIDITYXCRISIS 
which had a positive sign and LLPXCRISIS that 
had a negative sign was consistent with the theory 
Table 3. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable =  COSTD 
Crisis Period 1997-1998 Crisis Period 2008 
Independent Variables 
LAG COSTD 0.09528*** -2.33680** 
 (0.000) (0.018) 
ZSCORE -0.00240 0.05377* 
 (0.992) (0.073) 
LIQUIDITY -6.70592** -2.75280 
 (0.017) (0.269) 
LLP 16.62653** -0.12698 
 (0.040) (0.319) 
ZSCORE XCRISIS 0.00499 -0.12400** 
 (0.985) (0.038) 
LIQUIDITYXCRISIS 5.28492* -2.11317 
 (0.079) (0.867) 
LLPXCRISIS -16.42473** 2.29172 
 (0.042) (0.185) 
CUSTOMERD -0.22468** -0.06544*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) 
SIZE 0.38568*** 0.07331 
 (0.000) (0.316) 
OVERHEAD 35.99287*** 20.11706** 
 (0.000) (0.013) 
LERNER -0.28264*** -0.56418*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) 
CONC 2.68749*** 3.45036** 
 (0.000) (0.019) 
PRIVATECRED -0.01001*** 0.01835** 
 (0.000) (0.033) 
GDPGR -2.15636*** 2.80903 
 (0.000) (0.164) 
INFLATION 0.80935*** 0.41286* 
 (0.001) (0.074) 
 
This table presents the result from Arrelano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data. The 
dependent variable is the cost of deposit (COSTD). It was measured by the annual interest ratio towards the total 
deposit. For Independent variables, we include one lag of the dependent variable (LAG COSTD). Furthermore, this 
study includes ZSCORE, LIQUIDITY, and LLP are alternative bank risk measures as independent variables. ZSCORE 
is calculated with an asset return level (ROA) and added with the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of 
the asset return. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
gross loans. CRISIS constitutes a dummy variable that took a value of 1 for one year after the banking crisis and zero for 
the period before the crisis. CUSTOMERD was the total ratio of customer's savings towards the total compulsory 
interest. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. OVERHEAD is defined as the non- interest bank's burden 
divided by the total assets. LERNER is defined as the difference between the price and the marginal costs expressed as 
a percentage of the price. CONC was a proxy for the bank concentration level and defined as a fraction of the three 
largest banks as part of the assets of all public banks in our sample. PRIVATECRED is calculated with a "private credit 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions over GDP". GDPGR is the annual growth rate of real GDP per 
capita. INFLATION is the annual inflation rate from the GDP deflator. 
*  Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
**Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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that a sensitivity reduction of the bank deposit 
costs towards the banking risks.  This result was 
consistent with Cubillas, et al. (2012), Hadad, et al 
(2011) and Demirguc- Kunt and Huizinga (2004). 
At the three prior studies, the explicit guarantee 
from the government towards the savings was 
strongly believed as the main reason for the 
weakening of the market discipline.  
In the meantime based on the above data 
processing, it could be concluded that the banking 
crisis that occurred in Indonesia during the period 
of 2008 had caused the market discipline level in 
Indonesia to increase. The significant influence of 
the ZSCORE variable having a positive sign 
indicated the absence of a market discipline prior 
to the banking crisis. Then the significant effect of 
the ZSCOREXCRISIS variable having a negative 
sign which was consistent with the theory that a 
sensitivity augmentation had occurred off the depo-
sit costs to the banking risks after the banking 
crisis. This result was consistent with Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) who had held a research on 
three countries, i.e. Argentine, Chile and Mexico 
from 1980- 1990. They found the fact that the 
depositor would penalize the banks for their risky 
behavior, by withdrawing their deposits and 
requesting a higher interest rate. The market 
discipline became more important after the crisis. 
The negative sign of the CUSTOMERD varia-
ble during the crisis period of 1997/1998 and 2008 
showed that the banks paid an average of lower 
interest rate for warrantied savings (Cubillas, et 
al., 2012). In addition, the positive sign of the 
variable SIZE during the crisis period of 1997-1998 
was consistent with the statement that larger 
banks had a bigger choice to own a better invest-
ment and compete more intensively compared to 
smaller banks. Then the positive sign of the 
OVERHEAD variable on the regression result 
during the crisis period of 1997/1998 and 2008 
showed that the banks were not efficient in their 
operation. The negative sign of the variable 
LERNER on both regressions was consistent with 
Hadad et al (2011), whereby the market used a 
stronger market strength to pay a lower interest 
rate on the customer’s savings.  
Then the positive sign on the variable CONC 
showed that the market concentration level 
influenced the bank deposit interest rate, where for 
more concentrated industries the saving’s interest 
rate would augment. The regression output of the 
PRIVATECRED variable during the crisis period 
of 1997/1998 showed that the higher development 
level of the banks would reduce the cost of fund of 
these banks. On the other side, the result of the 
PRIVATECRED regression variable in 2008 
showed that the larger banking development 
increased the cost of fund of this bank. 
The negative sign on the variable GDPGR on 
the regression output during the crisis period of 
1997/1998 showed the facts that the higher 
economic growth decreased the bank’s cost of fund. 
Finally, the positive sign of the inflation variable on 
both regression results showed that when inflation 
increased the cost of the fund will also increase. 
From the above data analysis result, the 
hypothesis of this research was answered. From 
the data processing result, it could be concluded 
that the banking crisis that happened in Indonesia, 
both in 1997/ 1998 and in 2008 had a significant 
effect towards the banking crisis. The banking 
crisis of 1997/1998 had caused the weakening of 
the market discipline level in Indonesia. Conse-
quently, this research accepted the first hypothesis 
(H1) and the second hypothesis (H2) which stated 
that the banking crisis of 1997/1998 and the 
banking crisis of 2008 had a significant impact 
towards the market discipline level in Indonesia. 
Further, the regression result conducted by 
the researcher also found the fact, that the market 
discipline level was different in Indonesia after the 
banking crisis of 1997/1998 and 2008. At the 
banking crisis that happened in 1997/1998, the 
facts were found that there was a weakening of the 
market discipline level in Indonesia. On the other 
hand at the banking crisis of 2008 facts were found 
that there was a strengthening of the market 
discipline level in Indonesia. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that this research disapproves the third 
hypothesis (H3), which meant that there was a 
market discipline level difference in Indonesia after 
the banking crisis of 2008. During the 1997/1998 
crisis the Indonesian government was still using 
the full blanket guarantee scheme, however, for the 
2008 crisis, the Indonesian government had 
already used the limited blanket guarantee. The 
policy difference in the banking customers’ 
warranty was strongly suspected to become the 
main factor of causing the result difference at the 
1997/1998 crisis as well as the 2008 crisis.  This 
result was consistent with the findings of Cubillas, 
et al. (2012), Haddad et al. (2011) as well as 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004). Those 
studies encountered the fact that government’s 
explicit warranty towards the savings, and crisis 
handling policy, which had an accommodative 
nature, had caused the weakening of the market 
discipline after the banking crisis. 
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From Table 4, it could be seen that the sign 
and significant influence on the variable 
LIQUIDITY (-) with a p-value of 0.08 and LLP (+) 
with a p-value of 0.38 showed the market discipline 
presence at domestic banks before the banking 
crisis of 1997/1998 in Indonesia. Meanwhile if we 
look at the sign and significant influence of the 
variable LIQUIDITYXCRISIS (+) with a p-value of 
0.027 and LLPXCRISIS (-) with a p-value of 
0.041which showed a decline in the deposit cost 
sensitivity towards the banking risks after the 
banking risks at the domestic bank, as a negative 
influence of LIQUIDITY on the banking deposit 
costs and the positive influence of LLP towards the 
banking risks. Based on the above facts it could be 
concluded that a weakening of the market disci-
pline at domestic banks in Indonesia happened 
after the banking crisis of 1997/1998. While for the 
Table 4. Regression Results for Domestic Bank and Foreign Bank in Indonesia 
Dependent Variable = COSTD Crisis Period 1997-1998 Crisis Period 2008 
Independent Variables Domestic Bank Foreign Bank Domestic Bank Foreign Bank 
LAG COSTD 0.08044*** -0.10601 -2.58537** 0.00363 
 (0.001) (0.133) (0.016) (0.957) 
ZSCORE -0.02492 -0.04658 0.09313* -0.00156 
 (0.928) (0.470) (0.079) (0.696) 
LIQUIDITY -6.97062*** 1.40361 -4.27262 1.13615* 
 (0.008) (0.431) (0.173) (0.098) 
LLP 16.21422** -1.19558 0.03787 -0.00811 
 (0.038) (0.601) (0.672) (0.637) 
ZSCORE XCRISIS 0.01014 0.05242 -0.18975** 0.01245** 
 (0.971) (0.413) (0.018) (0.036) 
LIQUIDITYXCRISIS 6.58150** -1.24306 0.07129 -6.18955* 
 (0.027) (0.425) (0.995) (0.087) 
LLPXCRISIS -15.83887** 1.16924 2.30668 -0.28940 
 (0.041) (0.609) (0.197) (0.158) 
CUSTOMERD -0.21179** -0.17059*** -0.06750*** -0.15638*** 
 (0.038) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007) 
SIZE 0.383039*** 0.00968 0.11017 0.00902 
 (0.000) (0.334) (0.216) (0.447) 
OVERHEAD 36.33125*** 2.84640*** 19.94362** 3.02978** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
LERNER -0.25223*** -0.16519*** -071615*** -0.12521*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
CONC 2.71646*** 0.18863*** 4.20928** -0.02191 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.018) (0.801) 
PRIVATECRED -0.00912*** 4.62e-06 0.01876** -0.00146 
 (0.000) (0.995) (0.040) (0.207) 
GDPGR -2.08970*** -0.38577* 2.96102 -1.15691*** 
 (0.000) (0.094) (0.203) (0.005) 
INFLATION 0.82000*** 0.06485 0.61032** 0.06651 
 (0.000) (0.160) (0.060) (0.139) 
 
This table presents the result from Arrelano and Bond (1991) one-step GMM difference estimator for panel data. The 
dependent variable is the cost of deposit (COSTD). It was measured by the annual interest ratio towards the total 
deposit. For Independent variables, we include one lag of the dependent variable (LAG COSTD). Furthermore, the 
researcher includes ZSCORE, LIQUIDITY, and LLP is alternative bank risk measures as independent variables. 
ZSCORE is calculated with an asset return level (ROA) and added with the capital asset ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of the asset return. LIQUIDITY is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.  LLP is the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total gross loans. CRISIS constitutes a dummy variable that took a value of 1 for one year after the banking 
crisis and zero for the period before the crisis. CUSTOMERD was the total ratio of customer's savings towards the total 
compulsory interest. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. OVERHEAD is defined as the non- interest bank's 
burden divided by the total assets. LERNER is defined as the difference between the price and the marginal costs 
expressed as a percentage of the price. CONC was a proxy for the bank concentration level and defined as a fraction of 
the three largest banks as part of the assets of all public banks in our sample. PRIVATECRED is calculated with a 
"private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions over GDP". GDPGR is the annual growth rate of 
real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the annual inflation rate from the GDP deflator. 
*  Indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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data processing result for the foreign bank the 
writer could not find a conclusive proof, this was 
caused due to the absence of a significant indepen-
dent variable. 
While for the banking crisis of 2008, for the 
above model it could be seen that the sign and 
significant effect on the variable ZSCORE (+) with 
a p-value of 0.079 showed us the absence of market 
discipline for domestic banks prior to the 
2008banking crisis in Indonesia. Further, if we 
observe the sign and significant influence of the 
variable ZSCOREXCRISIS (-) with a p-value of 
0.018, it showed there was an increase of the 
deposit costs sensitivity towards the banking risks 
after the banking crisis on the domestic bank, as a 
positive influence of ZSCORE on the bank deposit 
costs. Based on the above facts it can be concluded 
that an increase of the market discipline on 
domestic banks in Indonesia happened after the 
banking crisis of 2008. Further, for foreign banks 
in 2008 could be seen that the signs and significant 
impact on the variable LIQUIDITY (+) with a p-
value of 0.098 showed the absence of the market 
discipline on foreign banks before the banking 
crisis of 2008 in Indonesia. In the mean time when 
we see the sign and significant influence of the 
variable LIQUIDITY X CRISIS (-) with a p-value of 
0.087 it showed an increase of the deposit costs 
sensitivity towards the banking risks after the 
banking crisis on foreign banks, as a positive 
influence of LIQUIDITY on the bank deposit costs. 
From the above analysis, the result showed 
that a weakening of the market discipline on 
domestic banks occurred after the banking crisis of 
1997/ 1998. This study did not find a conclusive 
result towards the foreign banks because all inde-
pendent variables that detected a market discipline 
level were not significant. These insignificant 
results were suspected due to the insufficient total 
number of samples. So that, during the crisis 
period of 1997/1998 the writer could not answer the 
fourth hypothesis (H4). 
While at the 2008 crisis facts were found that 
an augmentation of the market discipline after the 
banking crisis both for domestic banks and foreign 
banks occurred, which meant answering and 
accepting the fourth hypothesis (H4) namely there 
were no differences between the market discipline 
level after the banking crisis of 2008 between 
foreign banks and domestic banks in Indonesia. 
This result was opposite to what was found by 
Hadad, et al (2011) that conducted the research 
using the crisis period of 1997/1998, whereby at 
this research it was found that the market 
discipline level for foreign banks was better 
compared to domestic banks. 
Robust Examination 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, 
the regression was run without some independent 
variable and explanatory variable which highly 
correlated. LIQUIDITY and SIZE were excluded 
because of their strong correlation. After the 
deletion of those variables, this study found the 
basic results did not change. Furthermore, a 
regression was run with static panel data 
procedures, using both fixed and random effects 
and find the basic results did not change. The 
study uses all of the bank in Indonesia as a sample. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study summarized that the banking 
crisis of 1997/1998 had a significant influence on 
the market discipline level in Indonesia where the 
crisis weakened the market discipline level in 
Indonesia. On the other hand, the banking crisis of 
2008 had a significant influence towards the 
market discipline level in Indonesia, whereby this 
crisis strengthened the market discipline level in 
Indonesia. The difference in these results maybe 
because of the previous research Indonesia was 
still using the ”full blanket guarantee” system, 
while regarding the research conducted by the 
writer in 2008 Indonesia was already using the 
“limited blanket guarantee” scheme. Moreover, this 
research found also facts that there was a 
weakening of the market discipline on domestic 
banks after the banking crisis of 1997/1998, but the 
writer did not find a conclusive result on foreign 
banks because all independent variables identified 
a market discipline level which was not significant. 
While at the crisis of year 2008, facts were found 
that a strengthening of the market discipline 
happened after the banking crisis, both on domestic 
banks and foreign banks. It was implied that there 
was no difference in the market discipline level 
after the banking crisis of 2008 between foreign 
banks and domestic banks in Indonesia. 
For further studies, this research could be 
extended by investigating what factors influenced 
the change in the market discipline level after a 
banking crisis. Moreover, the researcher could 
further conduct a trans-national research and 
enter a limited blanket guarantee savings scheme 
using a degradation based on the risks that could 
be applied in Indonesia in 2015. 
This results suggested the banks to be more 
prudent in minimizing the occurrence of a banking 
crisis. The banks are expected to be able to manage 
the insolvency risks, liquidity risks and credit risks 
that they own. The result of the strengthening of 
the market discipline after the banking crisis of 
Sikatan: Banking Crises and Market Discipline in Indonesian Banking Industry 
 
47 
2008 showed that the depositors were already 
concerned towards the banks' behavior so that the 
banks had to show the banker behaviors, such as 
prudent, honest and the process in taking firm 
decisions. 
For the regulators, these research results 
were expected to enable them to take a decision or 
policy that increase the market discipline, such as 
the strengthening of the banking industry super-
vision. In addition, the regulator was expected to be 
able to apply the regulation Basel III and savings 
guarantee scheme limited blanket guarantee with 
degradation based on the immediate risk in order 
to create a healthy world banking condition and 
prevent a crisis to happen. 
For the depositor, it was expected that the 
depositor can be more concerned towards the risky 
banking behavior in order to minimize a banking 
crisis to happen and an incident that would create 
losses to bank customers. 
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